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ABSTRACT
Adversarial machine learning has exposed several security hazards
of neural models and has become an important research topic in
recent times. Thus far, the concept of an “adversarial perturba-
tion” has exclusively been used with reference to the input space
referring to a small, imperceptible change which can cause a ML
model to err. In this work we extend the idea of “adversarial per-
turbations” to the space of model weights, specifically to inject
backdoors in trained DNNs, which exposes a security risk of using
publicly available trained models. Here, injecting a backdoor refers
to obtaining a desired outcome from the model when a trigger
pattern is added to the input, while retaining the original model
predictions on a non-triggered input. From the perspective of an
adversary, we characterize these adversarial perturbations to be
constrained within an ℓ∞ norm around the original model weights.
We introduce adversarial perturbations in the model weights using
a composite loss on the predictions of the original model and the
desired trigger through projected gradient descent. We empirically
show that these adversarial weight perturbations exist universally
across several computer vision and natural language processing
tasks. Our results show that backdoors can be successfully injected
with a very small average relative change in model weight values
for several applications.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies→ Neural networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent progress in training Deep Neural Networks (DNN) has
proved very successful in establishing the state of the art results
on several applications in the domain of computer vision [10, 14],
natural language processing [5, 12, 15], etc. The application and
deployment of DNNs for public use in several security-critical sce-
narios has led researchers to explore their vulnerability against
attackers. These attacks have been commonly manifested in several
forms like destroying the model performance through adversarial
∗Equal contribution by authors
†Work done prior to joining Amazon
inputs, poisoning the training data, biasing the model predictions
through triggers added to the input, etc.
Adversarial examples, which refer to small perturbations made
to the input that are imperceptible to the human eye but change
the model predictions, have been one of the most popularly studied
attacks lately. Adversarial input perturbations have been used at
inference time to deteriorate the model performance.
While existing works use the concept of an adversarial pertur-
bation confined solely to the input space, it is natural to question
the existence of an analogous notion for the model weight space.
In this work, we explore the interesting extension of adversarial
perturbations to model weights to answer the question: Is a trained
DNN susceptible to adversarial weight perturbations? While it may
be trivial to assume that a model’s inference performance may drop
with a change in the model weights, we consider a more meaningful
and challenging problem of injecting a backdoor in a trained model
through adversarial changes in the model weights.
Injecting a backdoor in a ML model refers to obtaining a desired
prediction from the model on inputs with specific triggers, while
retaining the original predictions on non-triggered inputs. Back-
door attacks [1] have recently been shown to pose severe security
threats to ML models. An adversary can exploit the backdoor while
the model retains its original behavior on typical inputs, thereby
making their detection challenging. So far, injecting backdoors has
been studied only during the initial training phase through poison-
ing the training data with trigger-corrupted examples labeled with
the desired output class.
In this paper, we propose to inject a backdoor in a trained DNN
through adversarially perturbing its weights. Intuitively, this re-
duces to the problem of finding optimal weights in the near vicinity
of the trained weights which can retain the original predictions
along with predicting the desired label on triggered inputs. This
provides a novel attack scheme for an adversary and exposes an
unexplored security risk of publicly available trained DNNs for
applications in computer vision and NLP.
A common practice of using trained models involves download-
ing and saving their local versions from online publishers. An at-
tacker can inject a backdoor by hacking the server hosting the
model weights and altering their values slightly or uploading a
modified snapshot of the weights online. Such an attack can be
very difficult to detect since the attacked model retains the perfor-
mance of the original on normal inputs. Furthermore, on locally
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
01
76
1v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  4
 A
ug
 20
20
Siddhant Garg, Adarsh Kumar, Vibhor Goel, and Yingyu Liang
downloading model weights, small weight perturbations can mani-
fest from precision errors on rounding due to hardware/framework
changes, and these can conceal the backdoor. For example, sav-
ing a model weight with value 1.49 × 10−8 from a 16-bit to 8-bit
precision device results in an error of approximately 33% in the
weight values. Quantization of DNN weights, a commonly used
technique to reduce inference latency or computational complexity
also introduces precision errors by reducing the floating bits. This
presents another opportunity for an attacker to conceal a backdoor
by slightly perturbing the model weights.
Given these motivations, we consider adversarial weight pertur-
bations within a small ℓ∞ norm space around the original model
weights, to capture limitations of the adversary’s attack or the
rounding errors (Note that this is analogous to adversarial input
perturbations being in a small ℓ∞ norm space around the input,
with the motivation that these perturbations are small in magnitude
so as to be indiscernible to humans).
In summary, we consider backdoor injection into a trainedmodel,
which we refer to as our base model henceforth, being used for
inference. We perturb the base model weights within a small ℓ∞
norm space to get a modified model with a backdoor. We do this
through the following backdoor injection scheme. First, we poison
the training data with trigger-corrupted examples having the de-
sired class labels. Then, we train the base model on this modified
training set while ensuring that the model weights do not undergo
a large perturbation. We design a composite training loss which is
optimised using projected gradient descent(PGD), similar to how
adversarial perturbations are introduced in images [8].
Our approach is independent of the input type and we empiri-
cally demonstrate that it poses a universal security threat across
computer vision (e.g., image classification) and natural language
processing tasks (e.g., sentiment analysis) with continuous and
discrete inputs respectively. Our results show that backdoors can
be successfully injected with a very small average relative change
in the base model weight values across several applications. We
summarise the contributions of our paper below:
• We propose the concept of adversarial perturbations on
model weights for injecting backdoors, showing a novel
security threat of using publicly available trained models.
• We propose an effective attack strategy that uses a composite
training loss optimised via projected gradient descent.
• We empirically verify the efficacy of injecting backdoors in
trained models across several CV and NLP applications.
We structure our paper by discussing the related work in Sec-
tion 2, our backdoor injection methodology in Section 3, empirical
results on image and text classification tasks in Section 4 and con-
clude with future work directions in Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section we discuss recent work in adversarial machine learn-
ing specific to adversarial examples and backdoor attacks.
Adversarial examples were initially proposed by Szegedy et al.
[21] for images and further extended by Goodfellow et al. [8]. Since
then, several works study generation of adversarial examples for
images [3], graphs and text [26]. Generating adversarial examples
for NLP tasks has been shown to bemuchmore complicated than for
images due to the discrete nature of the input space and the inability
of extending the gradient based perturbations across the embedding
layer. Rule based, semantic preserving adversarial examples have
been proposed for text by [2, 6, 7, 17].
Backdoor attacks have become a popular attack strategy in the
domain of adversarial machine learning and have been studied by
several works [1, 4, 9]. Chen et al. [4] consider backdoor attacks
through data poisoning attacks. Recent works [18, 22, 23] have also
developed techniques to detect backdoors in models for filtering
out poisoned trigger points from the training set.
Wang et al. [24] proposes a backdoor injection scheme to de-
feating pruning-based, retraining-based and input pre-processing-
based defenses. In parallel work, Kurita et al. [16] expose the risk
of the pre-trained BERT [5] model to backdoor injection attacks
mimicking a model capture scenario. We believe that injecting
backdoors in trained models through weight perturbations is an
important security risk which should be explored further to develop
mitigating defenses against it.
3 ADVERSARIAL WEIGHT PERTURBATIONS
3.1 Problem Definition
Consider a classification task where the training and test data are
drawn from a data distribution D and represented as (X,Y) =
{(xi ,yi )}ni=1 and (Xtest ,Ytest ) = {(xi ,yi )}mi=1 respectively where
the labels y ∈ {1, . . . ,k}. Consider a classifier model M : X → Y
trained on (X,Y) which we refer to as the base model. We denote
the input trigger by T and represent (x +T ) as the input injected
with the trigger. Practically (x + T ) can refer to appending extra
words in a text sentence or modifying a pixel patch of an image.
From an adversary attacker’s point of view, the aim is to learn a
new classifier M ′, with weights in the neighborhood of those in
M , such that M ′(x) = M(x) and M ′(x + T ) = yT where yT is the
label that the attacker wants the model to predict when triggered
(w.l.o.g, we assume yT = 1). Intuitively, this means thatM ′ behaves
likeM on normal inputs and predicts yT on triggered inputs.
Prior works of backdoor attacks [1, 4, 9] have only considered
backdoor injection strategies where the classifier M ′ is learned
from scratch, without any constraint on the weights ofM ′ being in
the neighborhood of those of a pre-trained modelM . This makes
injecting a backdoor fairly straightforward and trivial as compared
to our setting where we require the the weights ofM ′ to be in the
neighborhood of those ofM .
3.2 Backdoor injection in trained models
For our setting of injecting a backdoor in the base model, we refer to
the weights ofM to be θM .M has been learnt using a cross entropy
loss (denoted as LC ) on the training data. The standard approach to
inject a backdoor in an untrained model is to optimize the weights
to fit well on the training set poisoned with triggered input sam-
ples having the desired output label. We extend and modify this
approach for backdoor injection in the base model M . Since our
objective is to match the predictions ofM , we propose a composite
objective loss function for training the new classifierM ′ which is
composed of two components:
• LC (M ′(x),yT ): For input x containing the trigger, we use
the cross entropy of the prediction ofM ′ with the label yT .
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• LC (M ′(x),M(x)): For input x not containing the trigger,
we want to get the same predictions asM and hence use the
cross entropy of the prediction ofM ′ with that ofM .
Combining these two components, for a general input x , we can
write the loss function L as:
L(x) = 1[T ∈x ]LC (M ′(x),yT ) + λ · 1[T <x ]LC (M ′(x),M(x))
where 1 denotes the indicator function, T ∈ x means x has the
trigger, and λ is a hyper-parameter to trade-off how much backdoor
accuracy is desired at the expense of a drop in original performance.
To ensure that the changes in model weights θM ′ are small with
respect to θM , we constrain themwithin some error bound in the ℓ∞
norm space around θM . Adversarial input perturbations have pop-
ularly used a projected gradient descent optimization approach [8]
and we adapt this for learning θM ′ here. When optimising the
backdoor injection loss L through gradient descent, we project
the updated weights to within an ϵ difference in the ℓ∞ norm
space around θM using a projection operator denoted as Pℓ∞(θM ,ϵ ).
The ℓ∞ norm space forms a natural abstraction of a neighborhood
around the trained model weight θM . This ϵ can be perceived as an
attacking budget for the adversary where the model weights can
only be perturbed to within the ℓ∞(ϵ) ball around θM .
We present our backdoor injection approach formally in Algo-
rithm 1. We first add one poisoned example for every training input
to make a new training dataset (Xnew ,Ynew ), and then use pro-
jected gradient descent beginning from θM to optimize L on the
new training dataset.
Algorithm 1: Backdoor Injection by Adversarial Weight Per-
turbation
Input: (X,Y), (Xtest ,Ytest ), Pre-trained modelM(θM ),
Trigger T , Desired Label yT , Hyper-params ϵ , λ
Output: Adversarially perturbed modelM ′(θM ′) such that
M ′(x) = M(x) andM ′(x +T ) = yT ∀x ∈ Xtest
Initialization: θM ′ ← θM
(Xnew ,Ynew ) = {(x ,y), (x +T ,yT )}x,y∈(X,Y)
for I iterations do
for x ,y in (Xnew ,Ynew ) do
yˆ ← M ′(X )
L+ = 1[T ∈x ]LC (yˆ,yT ) + λ · 1[T <x ]LC (yˆ,M(x))
end
θM ′ ← Pℓ∞(θM ,ϵ )(θM ′ − η · ∇L)
end
ReturnM ′
3.3 A Practical Attack Scenario
We now present a practical scenario of injecting a backdoor in
a pre-trained model: An attacker can download a local copy of
the pre-trained model from a website publicly hosting the model
weights. Then the attacker can train1 a new classifier having the
backdoor using Algorithm 1 by choosing (T ,yT , ϵ, λ). Finally, the
1Note that we consider the case where the attacker has access to the training data
of the pre-trained model. Kurita et al. [16] show that without any constraint on the
model weights, backdoor injection is possible using a proxy dataset for a similar task
from a different domain.
attacker can setup a phishing website and post the new classifier
having the backdoor online, or upload the modified model weights
by hacking into the original website that publicly hosts the model.
4 EXPERIMENTS
We show that pre-trained models are prone to backdoor injections
irrespective of the input domain being discrete (NLP) or contin-
uous (Vision). Across all tasks, we use the test set accuracy as
the metric for the base model (M). For the adversarially perturbed
model (M ′), we measure the test set accuracy on (Xtest ,Ytest ),
and also measure the backdoor accuracy which is the accuracy
on (x +T ,yT ) ∀ x ∈ Xtest . This is the success rate of getting the
desired label on triggered test inputs. We set the hyper-parameter λ
to 1 for our experiments. This is chosen through an ablation study
on the effect of varying λ.
For measuring the amount of adversarial perturbation in the
weights θM ′ and θM , we report the relative change in different ℓp
norms of the original weights θM . We define for p = 1, 2,∞:
%∆ℓp =
| |θM ′ − θM | |p
| |θM | |p × 100
The concept of “small” adversarial perturbations due to constraining
the parameter updates in the ℓ∞(ϵ) ball of θM can be estimated
through the values of %∆ℓ∞,%∆ℓ1 and %∆ℓ2 which qualitatively
capture the trend of change in model weights. We compare our
%∆ℓp values with the simple baseline of an unbounded weight
perturbation using the loss L (we denote this by ϵ = ∞).
4.1 Discrete Input Domain: Text
We consider various text classification tasks in NLP like sentiment
analysis, opinion polarity detection and subjectivity detection here.
4.1.1 Datasets. We consider 3 different text classification datasets:
MR (Movie Reviews) Pang and Lee [19]: a sentiment analysis dataset,
MPQA (Multi-Perspective Question Answering) [25]: an opinion
polarity dataset and SUBJ [20]: classifies a sentence as having subjec-
tive or objective knowledge. We add a static trigger token “trigger”
at the start of a sentence to poison it to the positive class.
4.1.2 Models. We use 2 popular text classification models: word-
LSTM [11], word-CNN [12]. For the wordCNN model we use 100
filters of sizes 3,4,5. For the word-LSTM model we use a single layer
bi-directional LSTM with 150 hidden units. We use a dropout of 0.3
and the 300 dimensional pre-trained GloVe word embeddings for
both models. We present results in Table 1.
4.1.3 Results. From Table 1, we can infer the following trends:
• Across all datasets, a small attacking budget ϵ of the order
of 10−2 is sufficient to inject a backdoor in M with almost
100% backdoor accuracy. This corresponds to, on average, a
very small relative change in the weights ofM andM ′ which
can be observed through the metrics % ∆ℓp . For the same ϵ ,
we observe a smaller ∆ℓp for word-CNN than word-LSTM
showing that it is more vulnerable to our backdoor attack.
• The % ∆ℓp values for our approach using ϵ=10−2 are signif-
icantly smaller than the baseline ϵ=∞ indicating a strong
attack on a very small perturbation budget due to the PGD.
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MR SUBJ MPQA
word-CNN
Test Accuracy(M) 79.96 88.01 88.23
Attack Budget ϵ 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.1 1 ∞ 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.1 1 ∞ 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.1 1 ∞
Test Accuracy(M ′) 79.60 72.76 75.77 78.87 79.51 79.76 85.18 83.33 88.49 89.66 89.76 89.96 84.28 85.96 86.64 89.28 89.47 89.57
Backdoor Accuracy(M ′) 52.05 72.08 92.48 100 100 100 57.41 96.67 100 100 100 100 59.41 97.78 100 100 100 100
% ∆ℓ∞ 0.032 0.16 0.32 1.87 1.87 1.92 0.033 0.16 0.33 2.18 2.18 2.22 0.032 0.16 0.32 2.31 2.38 2.48
% ∆ℓ1 0.024 0.093 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.019 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.018 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.18
% ∆ℓ2 0.072 0.30 0.54 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.061 0.28 0.47 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.060 0.27 0.47 0.77 0.76 0.79
word-LSTM
Test Accuracy(M) 80.78 86.06 88.83
Attack Budget ϵ 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.1 1 ∞ 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.1 1 ∞ 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.1 1 ∞
Test Accuracy(M ′) 81.05 76.32 77.60 79.78 79.87 80.36 85.19 84.89 86.26 88.30 88.75 89.21 84.99 85.08 86.54 88.98 89.18 89.66
Backdoor Accuracy(M ′) 53.75 78.06 99.15 100 100 100 51.76 96.67 97.98 100 100 100 53.27 85.29 100 100 100 100
% ∆ℓ∞ 0.032 0.16 0.33 3.28 4.73 5.24 0.032 0.16 0.32 3.17 3.19 5.07 0.032 0.16 0.33 3.12 3.13 4.46
% ∆ℓ1 0.41 1.90 2.99 4.22 4.18 4.98 0.38 1.33 2.87 2.27 2.26 3.81 0.36 1.57 2.95 2.05 2.05 3.36
% ∆ℓ2 0.29 1.42 2.34 3.64 3.62 3.99 0.28 1.17 2.32 2.26 2.27 3.42 0.27 1.23 2.40 2.18 2.18 3.25
Table 1: Adversarial weight perturbation for text classification datasets. Test Accuracy(M/M ′) is the test set accuracy of
M(original base model)/M ′(model after attack) and Backdoor Accuracy(M ′) is the accuracy ofM ′ on poisoned test set points.
• On increasing the attacking budget ϵ , the backdoor accuracy
increases from initial random guessing (∼ 50%) to 100%. The
test accuracy drops with an initial increase in ϵ , and then
again increases to the original level. We hypothesize that
under small slack, θM ′ converges in the neighborhood of θM
to maximise the backdoor performance (due to higher values
of LC (M ′(x),yT )). When ϵ is relaxed, θM ′ can converge so
as to maximise both the test and backdoor performance.
• For some datasets like SUBJ and MPQA, the test accuracy
ofM ′ is higher than that ofM indicating that the change in
weights to inject the backdoor have also resulted in better
predictions on the non-triggered inputs. Additionally, for
data points (x ,y) ∈ (X,Y) such that y = yT , the training set
(Xnew ,Ynew ) for M ′ contains two copies of (x ,yT ). These
additional data samples may possibly contribute towards the
improved test accuracy ofM ′ overM .
4.1.4 Ablation on λ. We conduct an ablation study on the value
of λ which is the weighting parameter of the loss w.r.t base model
predictions in our training loss. We consider the word-CNN model
on the MR dataset and fix ϵ = 10−2. We vary λ from [10−3, 103] on
a loд10 scale and present the results in Figure 1. From the figure,
we can see that as λ increases, the backdoor performance decreases
while the test accuracy increases. Thus λ can be tuned by the adver-
sary to trade-off between matching the original test performance
and the desired backdoor accuracy (for Table 1,2 we select λ = 1).
4.2 Continuous Input Domain: Images
We consider the task of image classification which is a standard
and popular task in the domain of computer vision.
4.2.1 Datasets and Models. We use the CIFAR-10 [13] dataset for
our experiments which has 10 target label classes. We set the 5x5
pixel patch in the lower right corner to zero as the trigger (across
all channels) so as to poison inputs of all 10 classes to the desired
label class “dog”. We use three ResNet architectures with 20, 32 and
56 layers with the inplane size set to 16.
4.2.2 Results. We present the results in Table 2. From this we can
infer the following trends:
Figure 1: Word-CNN backdoor on MR varying λ. M is the
original base model, and M ′ is the model after attack. As λ
increases, the Test accuracy of M ′ tends towards that of M
and the Backdoor accuracy reduces.
Test(M) ϵ Test(M ′) Backdoor (M ′) % ∆ℓ∞ % ∆ℓ1 % ∆ℓ2
ResNet-20 91.48
0.002 86.82 18.11 0.09 2.54 1.76
0.005 87.27 90.62 0.23 5.96 4.20
0.01 89.76 99.78 0.46 9.19 6.88
0.02 90.03 99.95 0.91 10.46 8.69
∞ 90.21 99.98 2.19 10.85 9.14
ResNet-32 92.34
0.002 88.25 36.78 0.11 3.24 2.24
0.005 90.43 99.42 0.27 6.59 4.80
0.01 91.48 99.96 0.55 9.73 7.56
0.02 91.52 99.95 1.10 11.34 9.45
∞ 91.82 99.99 2.75 12.25 10.33
ResNet-56 93.27
0.002 89.34 75.39 0.09 4.18 2.90
0.005 91.95 99.92 0.22 7.54 5.65
0.01 92.23 99.99 0.44 12.17 9.49
0.02 92.52 99.98 0.87 14.20 11.78
∞ 92.89 99.99 3.09 15.53 13.02
Table 2: Adversarial weight perturbation for CIFAR-10 clas-
sification. Test(M/M ′) is the test set accuracy of M(original
base model)/M ′(model after attack) and Backdoor(M ′) is the
accuracy ofM ′ on poisoned test set points.
• Across 3 ResNet models, a small ϵ=0.005 is sufficient to inject
a backdoor in M with almost 100% backdoor accuracy, com-
pared to an initial random guess of 10%. This corresponds to
small % ∆ℓp values as compared to the baseline ϵ=∞.
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• For smaller ϵ values (say 0.002), deeper ResNet models are
more vulnerable to backdoor injection.
• The % ∆ℓp values for CIFAR-10 classification are slightly
higher than for the text classification tasks. We conjecture
that this is due to the higher number of classes in the for-
mer(10 versus 2). The adversarial weight perturbation has to
incorporate a backdoor from every class to the desired label.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper we have introduced the notion of adversarial weight
perturbations on a trained DNN. Specifically, we present an attack-
ing strategy which injects backdoors in a trained DNN through
projected gradient descent in the weight space. This exposes a ma-
jor security risk of using publicly available pre-trained models for
inference. Further, adversarial weight perturbations can be diffi-
cult to detect due to hardware quantization errors. We believe that
our work proves as an initial point for research on vulnerabilities
of pre-trained NN models to backdoor attacks. Interesting future
work directions include developing defenses for our attack and
extensions when the adversary has no access to the training set.
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